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PUBLIC SUMMARY 
 SARS-CoV-2 transmission from human to mink is not lineage specific. 
 Mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants keep human-to-human transmission. 
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SARS-CoV-2 has recently been found to have spread from humans to minks and then 
to have transmitted back to humans. However, it is unknown to what extent the 
human-to-human transmission caused by the variant has reached. Here, we used 
publicly available SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequences from both humans and minks 
collected in Denmark and Netherlands, and combined phylogenetic analysis with 
Bayesian inference under an epidemiological model to trace the possibility of 
person-to-person transmission. The results showed that at least 12.5% of all people 
being infected with dominated mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants in Denmark and 
Netherlands were caused by human-to-human transmission, indicating this 
“back-to-human” SARS-CoV-2 variant has already caused human-to-human 
transmission. Our study also indicated the need for monitoring this mink-derived and 
other animal source “back-to-human” SARS-CoV-2 in future and that prevention and 
control measures should be tailored to avoid large-scale community transmission 
caused by the virus jumped between animals and humans. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is caused by a novel type of coronavirus 
(known as SARS-CoV-2, 2019-nCoV, or HCoV-19)
1-3
 that has led to more than 100 
million infections of which at least 1.2 million have died worldwide on 10
th
 
November 2020, posing a global concern on public health.
4
 Apart from humans, 



















 Other animals have also been considered as possibly susceptible 
hosts (e.g. rabbit, pig, fox, mink, and civet) of SARS-CoV-2 through the entry test 
with pseudotype virus with S gene of SARS-CoV-2 and affinity abilities between the 
receptor binding domain (RBD) of S and host ACE2 protein.
9
 In addition to 
human-to-animal transmission, SARS-CoV-2 in minks (Neovison vison) where it was 
initially introduced from humans could also transmit back to humans.
10
 The virus was 
also shown to obtain some ongoing mink-adapted mutations such as Y453F, F486L, 
and N501T.
11
 Since cross-species transmission has occurred and the SARS-CoV-2 can 
be transmitted back to humans from minks, it is important to clarify whether the 
“back-to-human” SARS-CoV-2 with ongoing mink-adapted mutations could further 
lead to transmission among humans. However, the reported study did not reach a 
conclusion on this point, but instead speculated that person-to-person transmission 
may have occurred.
10
 Genomic sequence can be used to trace person-to-person 
transmission for SARS-CoV-2,
12
 which represents an opportunity to confirm whether 
there was person-to-person transmission for the “back-to-human” SARS-CoV-2, even 
when epidemiological tracking information was not available or lacking. The main 
mink fur producing countries are Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, and China.
13
 It 
can be seen that Europe is the main production area of mink. Furthermore, mink fur 
delivered from European farms and sold at auction was worth 1.2 billion Euros in 
2016.
14
 Since tens of millions of minks have been culled to prevent further mutation 








isolated from minks) caused a catastrophic blow to the mink farming industry. 
 
In this study, we used publicly available SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequences, and 
combined phylogenetic analysis with Bayesian inference under an epidemiological 
model to infer the probability of direct transmission between patients being infected 
with mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants in Denmark and Netherlands to evaluate the 
extent of human-to-human transmission caused by mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 
variants. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Data Collection, Filtration and Pre-processing 
We retrieved genomic data from GISAID
15
 on Jan 6 2021. We discarded 
genomic data with no exact collection date (accurate to days). Mink-derived 
sequences were defined as SARS-CoV-2 genomes isolated from minks. Since the 
most dominated mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 genomes belonged to B.1.298 and B.1.8 
for Denmark and Netherlands, only human-derived and mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 
genomes from these 2 lineages for Denmark and Netherlands were used. Genomic 
sequences were aligned using Mafft v7.310.
16 
Then, we trimmed the uncertain regions 
in 3′ and 5′ terminals and also masked 30 sites (Supplementary Table 1) that are 











As recombination could impact the evolutionary signal, we searched for 
recombination events in these SARS-CoV-2 genomes using RDP4.
17
 No evidence for 
recombination was found in our dataset. We used jModelTest v2.1.6
18
 to find the best 
substitution model for each dataset from different countries according to the Bayesian 
Information Criterion. The best substitution model for datasets from Denmark and 
Netherlands was HKY and GTR+I, respectively. The list of genomic sequences used 
in this study were provided in Supplementary Table 2. The list of genomic sequences 
used in this study were openly shared via the GISAID initiative.
19
 We then used the 
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach implemented in BEAST 
v1.10.4
20
 to derive a dated phylogeny for SARS-CoV-2. Three replicate runs for each 
100 million MCMC steps, sampling parameters and trees every 10,000 steps. As 
genomic sequences used in each dataset were all from the same lineage, we assumed 
that they followed a strict molecular clock. The estimation of the most appropriate 
coalescent models for Bayesian phylogenetic analysis was determined using both 
path-sampling and stepping-stone models.
21
 The best fitting combination of prior of 
coalescent model was Bayesian skyline tree prior for both datasets (Supplementary 
Table 3). Tracer 1.7.1
22
 was then used to check the convergence of MCMC chain 
(effective sample size >200) and to compute marginal posterior distributions of 
parameters, after discarding 10% of the MCMC chain as burn-in. We also 
reconstructed the host for each ancestral branch by using the Bayesian asymmetric 
discrete trait evolution model
23








(BSSVS) framework. We determined whether there was sufficient temporal signal in 
each dataset, as it was the prerequisite for getting a reliable inference when performed 
phylodynamic analysis. Bayesian evaluation of temporal signal (BETS)
24
 was used to 
evaluate the temporal signal in each dataset. BETS relies on the comparison of 
marginal likelihoods of two models: the heterochronous (with tip date) and 
isochronous (without tip date) models. Analyses were performed with at least three 
independent replicates of 100 million MCMC steps each, sampling parameters and 
trees every 10,000 steps with the best substitution model and most appropriate 
combination of molecular clock and coalescent models determined above for each 
dataset. The marginal likelihoods were estimated by PS. The Bayes factor (BF) was 
then calculated based on the likelihoods of two models (heterochronous and 
isochronous). If the log BF >5 (heterochronous model against isochronous model), it 
indicated there was sufficient temporal signal in this dataset. The log BF was 
estimated as 227 and 458 for datasets from Denmark and Netherlands, respectively, 
suggesting that the temporal signal was sufficiently strong. For convenience, we 




As viral genomes were incompletely sampled and the pandemic is currently 
ongoing, TransPhylo v1.4.4
25
 was used to infer the transmission tree using the dated 








infection to onward transmission, denoted as G) of COVID-19 was previously 
estimated as 4.8±1.7 days,26 and we used these values to compute the shape and scale 
parameter of a gamma distribution of G using the R package epitrix.
27
 The 
distribution of sampling time (i.e. the time gap from infection to detection and 
sampling) was set equal to the distribution of generation time. We performed the 
TransPhylo analysis with at least 500,000 iterations simultaneously estimating the 
transmission tree, the proportion of sampling, the within-host coalescent time Neg, 
and the two parameters of the negative binomial offspring distribution (which 
represents the number of secondary cases caused by each infection). All results were 
generated after discarding the first part of the MCMC chains as burn-in 
(Supplementary Table 5). The MCMC mixing and convergence was assessed based on 
the effective sample size of each parameter (>200) and by visual examination of the 
MCMC traces. The probabilities of direct transmission from one host to another were 
estimated as the proportion of MCMC samples in which this direct transmission event 
occurred. The expected numbers of intermediates from one host to another were 
estimated as the average across the MCMC samples of the number of intermediates 
between the two hosts. 
 
Evaluation of Phylogenetic Uncertainty on the Inference of Transmission Chain 
Since the inference of transmission tree and further estimation on the probability 
of directed transmission were solely based on a dated-phylogeny. We then tested 








were randomly selected from the MCMC chains for TransPhylo analysis. The 
parameter setting was the same as above. The estimated bidirectional probability of 





The Geographical and Phylogenetic Distribution of Mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 
Variants 
As of Jan 6 2021, there were a total of 761 mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 genomes 
have been available. They came from four countries: Canada (4 genomes), Denmark 
(454 genomes), Netherlands (291 genomes), and Poland (12 genomes), respectively. 
All these mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 genomes belonged to 15 lineages. For viruses 
from Canada and Poland, they all belonged to lineage B.1.1 (Figure 1). In Netherlands, 
the dominated strains came from lineage B.1.298 (Figure 1). However, the dominated 
mink-derived variants in Denmark belonged to lineage B.1.8 (Figure 1). The widely 
phylogenetic distribution of mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 genomes suggested 
cross-species transmission events of SARS-CoV-2 from human to mink were not 
lineage specific. Considering the number of mink-derived variants, further analysis 
was mainly focused on those from lineage B.1.8 in Denmark and lineage B.1.298 in 
Netherlands. 
 
Identification of Cross-species Transmission Events 








independent cross-species transmission event was considered to be occurred only if a 
clade meets all the following criteria: i) the direct two branches after the root of the 
clade have different host, ii) posterior probability of both branch and ancestral host for 
the root of the clade > 0.8. In Denmark dataset, we found three independent 
cross-species transmission events (Figure 2). All of them were caused by 
human-to-mink transmission. In addition, we also found six SARS-CoV-2 genomes 
(in Clade I) from human were closed to mink-derived viral genomes, indicating they 
were highly likely to be transmitted from mink to human. However, we could not 
determine how many independent cross-species transmission events occurred due to 
the low posterior probability of branches. In Netherlands, three independent 
cross-species transmission events occurred in lineage B.1.298 (Figure 3). One of them 
was transmitted from human to mink, other two events were caused by transmission 
from mink to human, which contained one and five cases, respectively. Besides, we 
also found a cluster denoted as Clade I contained nine SARS-CoV-2 genomes from 
human were closed to mink-derived viral genomes, indicating they were highly likely 
to be transmitted from mink to human. However, we could only be sure that at least 
one independent cross-species transmission event has occurred between them. Besides, 
we also found additional four SARS-CoV-2 genomes from human were scattered 
within Clade III, indicating these four patients were also infected with mink-derived 
SARS-CoV-2 variants. Totally, we identified 18 patients being infected with 
mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants. We further tested whether there were 










Inference of Person-to-person Transmission Events of Mink-derived 
SARS-CoV-2 Variants 
We then calculated the probability of direct transmission between humans 
infected with mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants. In order to reduce the calculation, 
only clades with highly posterior probability of its root and contained humans infected 
with mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants were used to further analysis. In Denmark 
dataset, there are three patient pairs (D2/D3, D5/D6, and D1/D3) with bidirectional 
probability of direct transmission >0.5 (0.998, 0.731, and 0.607, respectively) (Figure 
4A). Meanwhile, the number of intermediates between D2/D3, D5/D6, and D1/D3 
were estimated as 0.002, 0.271, and 0.412, respectively (Figure 4B). All these results 
suggested that these three patient pairs were more likely to be transmitted from each 
other directly. In the Dutch dataset, we also found 2 pair of patients in Clade I (N7/N8, 
and N3/N4) with bidirectional probability of direct transmission >0.5 (0.95, and 0.931, 
respectively) (Figure 4C). In addition, the number of intermediates between N7/N8, 
and N3/N4 were estimated as 0.05, and 0.069, respectively (Figure 4D). There are 
also 2 pairs of patients in Clade II (N10/N11 and N13/N14) with bidirectional 
probability of direct transmission >0.5 (0.989, and 0.978, respectively) (Figure 4E). In 
addition, the number of intermediates between N10/N11, and N13/N14 were 









Validation of the Direct Transmission Events 
Since limited variations detected in mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants could 
not result in a highly resolved phylogeny, we next wanted to test how did 
phylogenetic uncertainty affect the result by repeating the analysis based on 10 trees 
randomly selected from MCMC chain. In the Danish dataset, the cluster with D1, D2 
and D3 always contained a patient pair with highly bidirectional probability of direct 
transmission (Figure 5). However, the bidirectional probability of direct transmission 
for D5 and D6 was lower than 0.5 in 2 randomly selected trees, indicating the 
inference of direct transmission between D5 and D6 could be affected by the 
phylogenetic uncertainty (Figure 5). In this case, we could conclude that only one 
person-to-person transmission event occurred in the Danish dataset. For the Dutch 
dataset, we found a similar pattern as in the Danish dataset that the phylogenetic 
uncertainty highly affected the inference of who infect whom. However, there was at 
least one direct transmission event with high bidirectional probability occurred in 
each cluster for 10 randomly selected phylogenies (Figure 6). Besides, we also found 
that N10-N14 are all employees in the same mink farm, indicating that the direct 
transmission between them could be more likely occurred. In this case, we could 
conclude that at least two person-to-person transmission events occurred in the Dutch 
dataset. In summary, we totally identified at least 3 direct transmission events with 
high bidirectional probability among humans infected with mink-derived 
SARS-CoV-2 variants in Denmark and Netherlands. It accounted for 12.5% of all 









We also found some mutations arising in those “back-to-human” SARS-CoV-2 
genomes compared to their close-related mink-derived ones. In the Danish dataset, 
C2062T (locating at the 5’ terminal of SARS-CoV-2 genome) was detected in D4. 
However, this mutation was not detected in other close related human SARS-CoV-2 
and closest mink-derived variant. A nonsynonymous mutation (C12008T result in 
Leu3915Phe in ORF1ab) were lost in both D5 and D6, compared to their closest 
related mink-derived variant. In the Dutch dataset, more mutations were detected. 
Among them, we found that there was no common mutation shared by all human 
genomes. Together with the limited number of mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 genomes 




Since the SARS-CoV-2 carried by mink could be transmitted back to humans,
10
 
it had led to the mass culling of infected animals, posing a huge threat to the public 
health and economy. The first thing we need to evaluate is whether the variant can 
continue to spread from person to person, and to study the extent of the current 
human-to-human transmission. We found that the phylogenetic type of dominant 
strains in different countries were not consistent (Figure 1), indicating that the 
cross-species transmission events of SARS-CoV-2 from human to mink were not 








transmitted from human to mink. However, if all subtypes of the SARS-CoV-2 can be 
transmitted to mink is still unknown and needs further research and confirmation. 
Several independent cross-species transmission events were identified in this study, 
which contained both human-to-mink and mink-to-human direction. We also detected 
at least three human-to-human transmission events with highly bidirectional 
probability in this study. However, we are not sure who infected whom, mainly due to 
the phylogenetic uncertainty caused by limited mutations. The phylogenetic 
uncertainty also caused different number of direct transmission event for each dataset 
(Figure 5&6). Yet, there was always one direct transmission event with high 
bidirectional probability occurred in each dataset. Under these circumstances, we 
could conclude that there were at least three direct transmission events identified in 
Denmark and Netherlands, accounting for at least 12.5% of all people infected with 
mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants in this study. However, the extent of 
human-to-human transmission caused by mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants was 
considered to be underestimated. The reasons are summarized as follows. First, not all 
viral genomes of patients infected with mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants were 
available right now. Second, the criteria of identifying direct transmission event were 
strict in this study, leading to a low true positive ratio. In this case, the mink-derived 
SARS-CoV-2 variants in human and then the extent of person-to-person transmission 
caused by this variant should be continuously monitoring. Despite mink was the only 
species so far that could be easily infected by humans with SAR-CoV-2, and then spill 








non-human mammals which could be infected by SARS-CoV-2 and were in frequent 
contact with humans. Under these circumstances, the contact between humans and 
susceptible animals should be cautious to prevent humans from transmitting 
SARS-CoV-2 to animals, so as to prevent the virus from continuously circulating and 
evolving in the animals. This will not only minimize the impact of the SARS-CoV-2 
on the breeding industry, as increased mortality was detected in farmed minks that 
were positive to SARS-CoV-2 RNA,
29
 but also decrease the probability of generating 
some novel and unpredictable mutants of SARS-CoV-2 within animals, thereby 
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Figure 1. The Geographical and Phylogenetic Distribution of Mink-derived 
SARS-CoV-2 Variants. The size of the pie is proportional to the number of 
mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 genomes available in GISAID. The different colors 
indicate the different subtype of mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants. 
Figure 2. Identification of Cross-species Transmission Events in Danish 
Dataset.Maximum clade credibility phylogeny for the Danish dataset. Branch colors 
indicate the most probable ancestral host. For selected nodes, colored numbers show 
the posterior probabilities of ancestral host and numbers in black are clade posterior 
probabilities. 
Figure 3. Identification of Cross-species Transmission Events in the Dutch Dataset. 
Maximum clade credibility phylogeny for the Dutch dataset. Branch colors indicate 
the most probable ancestral host. For selected nodes, colored numbers show the 
posterior probabilities of ancestral host and numbers in black are clade posterior 
probabilities. 
Figure 4. Identification of Direct Transmission Between Humans Being Infected with 
Mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 Variants. 
(A) The probability of directed transmission from infector (row) to infectee (column) 
for the Danish dataset. 
(B) The number of intermediates in the transmission chain between each pair for the 
Danish dataset. 








for the Clade I in the Dutch dataset.  
(D) The number of intermediates in the transmission chain between each pair for 
Clade I in the Dutch dataset.  
(E) The probability of directed transmission from infector (row) to infectee (column) 
for the Clade II in the Dutch dataset. 
(F) The number of intermediates in the transmission chain between each pair for 
Clade II in the Dutch dataset. 
Figure 5. The Influence of Phylogenetic Uncertainty on the Inference of Direct 
Transmission Pair for Danish Dataset.The direct transmission pair for the Danish 
dataset estimated from 10 randomly selected trees from MCMC chains. Nodes 
represent patients and the lines between each node represents the direct transmission. 
The width of the line is proportional to the bidirectional probability of direct 
transmission between each patient. If the bidirectional probability of direct 
transmission between each patient was >0.5, the line is purple, otherwise it is black. 
Figure 6. The Influence of Phylogenetic Uncertainty on the Inference of Direct 
Transmission Pair for the Dutch Dataset. The network graph of direction transmission 
pair for the Dutch dataset estimated from 10 randomly selected trees from MCMC 
chains. Nodes represent patients and the lines between each node represents the direct 
transmission. The yellow and green nodes represent nodes from Cluster I and II, 
respectively. The width of the line is proportional to the bidirectional probability of 
direct transmission between each patient. If the bidirectional probability of direct 
transmission between each patient was >0.5, the line is purple, otherwise it is black. 
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